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ABSTRACT 
Political Parties and Direct Democracy: An Analysis of the 2015 Greek Referendum 
 
by 
 
Megan E. Hansen, Master of Science 
Utah State University, 2016 
 
Major Professor: Dr. Randy T Simmons 
Department: Economics and Finance 
 
 
On July 5, 2015, Greek voters were asked to vote on whether the country should 
accept the terms of austerity offered by the European Union for bailout from the 
country’s financial crisis. With a turnout rate of 62.5% overall, 61.3% of Greeks voted 
“no.” While a majority of voters in every district opposed the bailout’s terms, the margin 
against the proposed austerity measures ranged from 51.2% in Lakonias to 73.8% in 
Chanion. This paper explores whether political parties influenced Greek voters’ decisions 
to accept or reject the EU's budgetary reforms. We first review the literature relevant to 
that question, focusing on whether party platforms are merely “cheap talk” or instead are 
salient in determining electoral outcomes. We then test our hypotheses empirically at the 
voting district level.  
iv 
In this model, our key independent variable is party influence, which is measured 
by party vote shares in the nationwide election held in January of 2015. The dependent 
variable is the percentage that voted “no” to austerity in July 2015 in each of Greece’s 56 
electoral districts. We also control for average age and the unemployment rate across 
regions, as well as the fraction of first-time voters in each electoral district. After 
conducting simple regression analysis, we report evidence that a pro-austerity party (New 
Democracy) was a significant factor impacting the results of the referendum. This 
research finding bolsters the claim that parties can shape electoral outcomes on questions 
decided by an institution of direct democracy.  
(36 pages) 
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT 
 
Political Parties and Direct Democracy: An Analysis of the 2015 Greek Referendum 
Megan E. Hansen 
 
In conducting this research, I wanted to explore whether political parties have an 
influence on measures of direct democracy. I decided to answer this question by using the 
2015 Greek referendum on austerity as a case study. By using regression analysis, I found 
evidence that at least one of the two strongest political parties in Greece had an impact on 
the outcome of the referendum.  
This research contributes to the literature on the strength and effect of political 
parties on election outcomes. This research is relevant to discussions about political 
parties within the framework of collective choice and democracy in general. In doing so, 
this research may contribute to future analyses of how political parties affect institutions 
of direct democracy. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
 
Last year (2015) was a bad year for Greece. In May of 2015 Greece’s national 
unemployment rate was nearly 25%, more than twice that of nearby Italy. In the first 
quarter of 2015, Greece had the highest debt-to-GDP ratio of any European Union 
member: 168% compared to an average of 92.9% in the Eurozone overall (Eurostat, 
2015). As a result, European Union leaders decided to craft a bailout plan complete with 
strict conditions for Greece’s continued membership in the EU and the Eurozone.  
The man responsible for negotiating on behalf of Greece was Alex Tsipras, the 
prime minister and leader of the Syriza party, which gained control of the Greek 
government in January 2015’s national elections. Tsipras spent months negotiating a 
bailout deal with Greece’s creditors before ending negotiations on June 26th 2015 and 
announcing that he would let the Greek people decide by holding a referendum (“How 
Greece’s Referendum Works,” 2015).  
The referendum was held on July 5th, 2015. Greeks turned out to cast either a 
“yes” or “no” vote on the question of whether Greece should accept the bailout package 
offered by the country’s creditors. Because the bailout agreement already had expired by 
the time the referendum was held, and because the question posed was unclear to many 
Greek voters, numerous observers claim that the referendum actually was a symbolic 
vote on whether Greece should remain in the Eurozone, the European Union, or both. 
Voters essentially were asked to express their opinions for or or against a “Grexit” from 
continued European integration (“How Greece’s Referendum Works,” 2015).   
2 
The actual bailout agreement being voted on was viewed by many Greeks as 
overly harsh. The terms of the agreement included restructuring the national sales tax 
with the goal of increasing revenue, an end to tax exemptions for Greek islands, 
disincentivizing early retirement, and phasing out a grant that provides additional income 
to pensioners (European Commission, 2015; Peter, 2015).  
In the run-up to the referendum, Prime Minister Tsipras urged Greek voters to 
vote against the terms of the bailout, arguing that a “no” vote would give him what he 
needed to negotiate a more favorable deal with Greece’s creditors (“So, we meet again,” 
2015). On the other side of the political spectrum, New Democracy, Greece’s more 
conservative opposition party, encouraged voters to accept the bailout, arguing that 
Greece needed a “yes” vote to remain in the good graces of European creditors and 
receive the financial assistance it so desperately needed.  
When the referendum results finally were tallied, a majority of Greek voters sided 
with Tsipras and the Syriza party, with 61.3% nationwide voting against austerity. This 
paper examines whether political parties helped determine how Greeks voted on austerity 
by conducting empirical analysis of the voting results.  
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LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
Citizens occasionally are asked to make specific policy decisions that elected 
officials are either unable or unwilling to make themselves. Much has been made, 
however, of the inability of ordinary people to choose rationally when faced with simple 
survey questions, let alone more complex public policy questions (Campbell, Converse, 
Miller & Stokes, 1960). If this view is correct, how does the average voter decide how to 
vote when asked to make a decision about a specific policy issue? 
Determining how members of the public develop and maintain opinions about 
political issues is a topic that has been discussed hotly. Despite the fact that many 
members of the public are rationally uninformed (Downs, 1957) or are “rationally 
irrational” (Caplan, 2007), incomplete information does not necessarily prevent them 
from identifying how they feel about particular issues, particularly when they are asked to 
vote on a specific -- and salient -- policy proposal. Citizens have opinions and can 
identify what they like or dislike, even if they cannot say why they have formed such 
opinions.  
One school of thought asserts that uninformed voters are unable or unlikely to 
gather information and answer questions about policy through a process little better than 
random guessing (Converse, 1964). Brennan (2009) even went so far as to argue that 
because citizens are rationally uninformed, they have a moral duty not to vote lest they 
“pollute the polls” by interjecting “noise” that undermines the signal sent by their better 
informed counterparts. Despite Brennan’s moral argument against uninformed voting, 
Converse and others correctly identifed a tendency of respondents to answer policy 
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questions even when they lack specific information about the policy in question 
(Campbell et al., 1960). Those authors laid the groundwork for a discussion of how 
voters reach conclusions without possessing all relevant information.  
A review of the literature makes it apparent that something more than random 
guessing is occurring; voters are utilizing decision strategies that draw on the limited 
information they possess to answer questions when asked (Popkin, 1991). Many scholars 
have disagreed about where individuals obtain information about candidates and policies. 
John Zaller (1992) proposed that opinions held by individuals are based on information 
that has become salient to them as they interact in the world every day. Individuals 
ultimately make decisions based on prior experience, relevance, heuristic value, and other 
factors that draw pieces of information to the front of their minds. Zaller’s model of how 
information is gathered, understood, and evaluated on an individual basis asserted that 
information is heard or seen, considered in light of other information, and filed away for 
future use. Thus, when the individual faces a similar situation in the future, the 
information is retrieved and applied in deciding how to respond to the new circumstances 
(Zaller, 1992). 
Building on Zaller’s work and asserting that previous information should have an 
effect on future decision making, some scholars have proposed that rather than simply 
retaining all of the necessary information, individuals utilize heuristic devices that allow 
them to parse the relatively large stock of information acquired beforehand in a 
systematic and efficient way. Given contributions to the literature that call into question 
the ability of individuals to retain even relatively small amounts of information, heuristic 
devices are of particular importance. 
5 
 The importance and ability of heuristic devices to help achieve this goal and 
improve the use of information, has been tested extensively. While the results of these 
tests have been mixed (Kuklinski & Quirk, 2001), they do provide some basis for 
believing that if summary statistics on which voters rely is correct - namely, strong 
enough to override other information, accurate, and applied in the proper context -- 
citizens can distill information both parsimoniously and systematically to reach the 
correct conclusion (Lupia, 1994). 
Given the potential of heuristic devices to provide citizens with a relatively low-
cost decision making strategy, the question that immediately arises is what is the “right” 
heuristic device?  Again the literature has provided a plethora of potential options. Such 
options can be understood, first, as types of processes that can be used to reach decisions 
and, second (Lau & Redlawsk, 2006), as specific cues and cue-givers that provide the 
information necessary within those processes (Rahn W. M., 1993; Taber & Lodge, 2006; 
Goren, 2005). 
 One potential heuristic device on which voters might rely is the positions political 
parties articulate on public policy issues. Those positions, most often communicated by 
party leaders, written in party platforms or manifestos, and delivered in speeches on the 
campaign trail, have been the subject of disagreement about their impact on voters, and 
their longer lasting impacts have been questioned by those who see the electioneering 
activities of political parties, including their campaign platforms, as a form of “cheap 
talk.”  
Farrell and Rabin (1996, p. 116) defined cheap talk as “costless, nonbinding, 
nonverifiable messages that may affect the listener’s beliefs.” From that point of view, 
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campaign rhetoric, pre-election advertising and written materials laying out partisan 
positions to be taken after Election Day do not credibly commit parties or the candidates 
they field to concrete policy agendas. Austen-Smith and Banks (2002) pointed out that 
such political gesturing can easily be labeled “cheap talk” in that it is relatively costless. 
Politicians and party leaders can set policy platforms for the purposes of getting elected, 
without necessarily having to carry through on those promises or producing any lasting 
impact on the voters they attract.  
Because party platforms are not enforceable contracts and are often costlessly 
ignored, except possibly at the next election cycle when voters can punish promise 
breakers and, moreover, voters’ memories are rationally short, voters have no reason to 
believe or to act on cheap political talk. Farrell and Rabin (1996, p. 108), however, 
asserted that most political talk is not dismissed offhand, and that “people take the usual 
or literal meaning seriously.” Thus, although talk is cheap and may not directly affect 
how people act, “talk definitely affects payoffs,” because people listen to what is being 
said, assess credibility, and then decide whether and how to act in response. 
Whether political talk is cheap is also affected by the incentives that individual 
politicians and voters face. Public choice thinkers have long pointed out that politicians, 
just like individual voters, are self-interested utility maximizers (Buchanan, 1999). 
Politicians maximize utility by gaining votes, which represent the currency that allows 
them to remain in office and to exercise political power.  
One of the most significant issues in a democratic system is that both voters and 
politicians have incomplete information. Anthony Downs (1957) suggested that political 
ideologies help voters overcome this information problem. Instead of having to spend the 
7 
time and effort necessary to become educated about every policy issue, voters use 
ideologies and party labels to understand how parties differ in general, and can then cast 
their votes according to which party ideology is closest to their own ideal points and that 
they believe will benefit them most personally. Political parties, and the politicians 
affiliated with them, recognize this fact.  
Thus, as Downs (1957, p. 137) noted, “political parties in a democracy formulate 
policy strictly as a means of gaining votes … to attain the income, power, and prestige of 
being in office.” In other words, parties create policies that they think will get them 
elected rather than seeking election in order to enact policies. Seen through this lens, 
political party platforms represent cheap talk in the sense that politicians do not 
necessarily want to see a given policy enacted, but rather adopt the policy positions they 
conjecture will most likely get them elected or reelected.  
In a multi-party system, the information problem becomes even more complex. 
When many parties exist with varying public policy platforms, parties often must enter 
coalitions to form a government. Coalitions may be necessary for parties to get the 
support of a majority of voters needed to enact policies (Downs, 1957). When such 
coalitions are formed, however, it becomes more difficult for voters to assign credit to 
individual parties when parliament enacts “good” policies or punish candidates and 
parties when “bad” policies are enacted. Unless one party controls an absolute majority of 
parliamentary seats, it may not be clear which parties are responsible for making policy 
within a coalition.  
Strong support nevertheless can be found in the literature that forges a theoretical 
link between party influence and the beliefs and actions of voters. This is especially the 
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case in the context of the European Union, both in terms of support for EU integration as 
well as what has been called ‘Euroscepticism.’ 
The literature on “Euroscepticism” discusses a “permissive consensus” that 
persisted until the 1980s in which citizens were “ill-informed, uninterested and generally 
favourably disposed” to European integration (Steenbergen, Edwards, & deVries, 2007, 
p. 15; de Vries, van der Brug, van Edgmond, & van der Eijk, 2011). Today, however, the 
political climate in Europe has changed, and political actors are much more tightly 
constrained by and responsive to public opinion (de Vries et al., 2011; Hooghe & Marks, 
2009). 
Some empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that political party platforms do 
matter in the European Union. For example, Ray (2003, p. 978) utilized a nonrecursive 
model to demonstrate that “party positions do influence electorate opinion,” although the 
extent of this influence “varies with levels of disagreement among parties, party unity, 
issue salience, and party attachment.” Ray’s study used data from the 1984, 1988, 1992 
and 1996 Eurobarometer surveys, which report variables that measure voters’ political 
interests and ideological closeness to parties (used as the independent variables), as well 
as support for European integration (used as the dependent variable). Ray also found that 
the effect of parties is stronger when an issue becomes particularly visible. For example, 
party influence was especially intense in 1992 because of extensive public debate 
regarding ratification of the Treaty on European Union.  
Scholars likewise have asked whether public opinion drives the actions of 
political parties or, alternatively, whether political elites shape the views of the masses. 
Evidence exists for linkages in both directions, with direct democracy measures having a 
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particularly significant influence on bottom-up linkages. For example, Matsusaka’s 
(2004) analysis of voter initiatives held in the U.S. states from 1957 to 2000 found that 
the threat of legislative action triggering a referendum causes legislators to modify bills 
in ways that move policy closer to the median voter’s preference. Other authors have also 
reported evidence supporting the claim that voters’ preferences shape the actions of 
political parties. Institutions that allow for popular referendums in particular create 
“strong incentives for political parties to align their policy stances with the positions of 
their constituents” (Steenbergen et al., 2007).  
This literature suggests that political parties can have a real influence on public 
opinions and actions, particularly in European Union countries and particularly for highly 
visible policy issues. This is especially the case in countries that allow for popular 
referendums. In the next section we will develop our hypotheses regarding why and how 
political parties influenced Greek voters in the referendum on austerity in July of 2015.  
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THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS 
 
This paper builds on the literature on cheap talk and the influence of political 
parties on the behavior of voters. We applied this literature to the Greek referendum on 
austerity, held in July of 2015, to examine whether political parties had a meaningful 
influence on the outcome of the referendum across all of that nation’s 56 voting districts. 
Our theory was that political parties take stances on issues, especially when it comes to 
highly visible and contested issues dealing with European integration, and that those 
stances are taken seriously by voters. The austerity measures presented to Greek voters in 
the wake of its recent financial crisis represented one such highly visible and contested 
issue.  
To test this theory, our null hypothesis was that parties had no meaningful impact 
in predicting how voting districts voted for or against austerity. Our alternative 
hypothesis was that parties had a meaningful effect in determining how voting districts 
voted for or against austerity.  
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BACKGROUND: THE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE OF GREECE 
 
Greece is a parliamentary republic consisting of a 300-seat parliament, elected by 
popular vote, and the President, who is elected by parliament. The Government of Greece 
comprises the Prime Minister and a Ministerial Council. General elections are held every 
four years and all Greek citizens of 18 years or more are enfranchised. Voting in Greece 
is compulsory; however, a 2001 constitutional revision removed the possibility of penal 
sanctions for non-voting citizens (Hellenic Parliament, 2016; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
2016). Greece is a multi-party system in which the party winning a plurality of the 
national votes automatically is awarded 40 parliamentary seats. The remaining 260 seats 
are distributed amongst all parties that earn at least three% of the national vote (USAID, 
2016).  
In this paper we used the results of the most recent parliamentary election held 
before the referendum on austerity to measure political party strength across the nation’s 
56 voting districts. Figure 1 provides a map of Greece’s 56 voting districts shaded by the 
percentage of voters in each district voting against austerity. As the map shows, in all 
voting districts a majority of voters opposed austerity; however, the margin against the 
proposed measures ranged from 51.2% in Lakonias to 73.8% in Chanion. 
In the general election held on January 25, 2015, seven parties exceeded the three-
percent threshold necessary to gain seats in the Greek Parliament. Of those, Syriza, which 
stands for “Radical Coalition of the Left,” earned 36.3% of the vote and 149 seats (just 
two shy of an absolute majority) (Ministry of Interior, 2015). 
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Figure 1. Map of 56 Greek Voting Districts (shaded by% that voted against austerity) 
 
Syriza, led by Alex Tsipras, gained popularity with young people and public 
sector workers by labeling itself as the anti-austerity party. Syriza’s leaders promised an 
end to the EU’s belt-tightening measures, as well as more public spending on programs to 
13 
provide public services, such as free electricity for low-income Greeks. After the January 
2015 general election, the Independent Greeks, a right-wing party, joined Syriza in an 
unlikely coalition mainly because of the parties’ shared anti bailout views (BBC, 2015, 
January 26). The Independent Greeks earned 4.75% of the national vote and 13 seats in 
the January parliamentary election (Ministry of Interior, 2015).  
Syriza’s primary competitor is New Democracy, a conservative party that, prior to 
January 2015, had governed Greece since 2012 under the leadership of Prime Minister 
Antonis Samaras. While in power, New Democracy worked to put in place austerity 
measures in an effort to help Greece recover from its ongoing financial problems. Those 
measures, however, faced popular opposition that helped fuel the rise to power of the 
anti-austerity party Syriza. New Democracy’s party platform has also included a 
commitment to keeping Greece in the European Union and the Eurozone (BBC, 2015, 
January 26). In the January 2015 parliamentary election, New Democracy earned 27.8% 
of the popular vote and 76 seats (Ministry of Interior, 2015).  
The party that received the third highest percentage of votes in January 2015 was 
Golden Dawn, earning 6.28% of the nationwide vote (Ministry of Interior, 2015). Golden 
Dawn is a far-rightwing party with a nationalist anti-European integration platform. The 
party has a strong anti-austerity stance (Smith, 2015). Other smaller parties include The 
River (To Potami), a pro-European and pro-austerity party, which earned 6.05% of the 
vote in January’s parliamentary election. The Panhellenic Socialist Movement (Pasok), 
was strong in post-WWII Greece, but lost support for its anti-austerity stance (BBC, 
2015, January 26). Pasok earned 4.68% of the vote in January of 2015. Finally, the Greek 
14 
Communist Party (KKE), which rejected Syriza’s proposal to join its coalition, earned 
5.47% of the vote. The vote totals are summarized in Table 1.  
 
Table 1 
Outcome of the January 2015 Parliamentary Election 
Party % of Nationwide Vote Received 
Syriza 36.34 
New Democracy  27.81 
Golden Dawn  6.28 
The River (to Potami) 6.05 
Greek Communist Party 5.47 
Independent Greeks 4.75 
Panhellenic Socialist Movement (Pasok) 4.68 
Total Vote Share 91.38 
 
 
Our regression analysis below focused on the vote shares of the two largest 
parties -- Syriza and New Democracy. This is because these parties have the most 
significant impacts on Greek politics today and have the strongest party platforms 
regarding austerity and the bailout deal offered to Greece by the European Central Bank 
(ECB). We also chose to include only the two major parties to avoid problems with 
multicollinearity that arise when we enter the vote shares of all seven parties in one 
model.    
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DATA AND METHODS 
 
Our dataset contains 56 observations -- one for each electoral district in Greece. 
Our dependent variable was the percentage of Greek voters in each voting district voting 
“no” on the austerity measures proposed by the ECB in the referendum held on July 5, 
2015. Data on voting on the referendum came from the Greek Ministry of Interior.  
 Because we were interested in examining the relationship between the 
referendum’s outcome and partisan support, our primary independent variables measured 
the extent of support each of Greece’s two major political parties enjoyed across voting 
districts. We measured political support by entering the percentage of votes earned by 
both Syriza and New Democracy in each voting district in the most recent parliamentary 
election before the referendum, held in January of 2015.  Like our data on the July 
election, this information was taken from the Greek Ministry of Interior. In using that 
information to measure political support, we assumed that political party identifications 
did not change significantly across voting districts from January to July of 2015.  
 Our other independent variables were controls for age, economic conditions, and 
population across voting districts. In searching for a variable that would control for age 
reasonably, we ran into several data problems. Information on average age in 2015 was 
not available at the voting district level, but only at the regional level. We therefore 
created a variable labelled average age that enters observations in the region and repeats 
that value for each voting district falling within that region. These data came from the 
Hellenic Statistical Authority. As such, average age is a regional fixed effect.   
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In seeking to control for age, we also found the percentage of first-time voters 
(who were 18 years old at the time of the election) in each voting district, but 2012 was 
the most recent year for which those data were available. In so doing, we assumed that 
the percentage of new voters did not change significantly across voting districts from 
2012 to 2015. Those data were taken from the Greek Ministry of Interior.  
We also hoped to control for economic conditions across voting districts, but 
encountered additional data challenges. We could not find unemployment rates at the 
voting district level, so we use used regional rates and repeated those average values for 
each voting district within a region. The most recent year for which unemployment rates 
are available was 2014, and those data came from Eurostat. In using this information, we 
again assumed that differences in unemployment rates across districts did not change 
significantly between 2014 and the 2015 referendum.  
Finally, we hoped to control for population variations, but once again were unable 
to find disaggregated data for 2015 at the electoral district level. We used the best data 
available, which were the number of registered voters in each voting district in 2012. We 
used the number of registered voters as a proxy for populations across voting districts. 
This makes some sense given that voting in Greece is compulsory. In using registered 
voters as a proxy for population, we assumed that populations did not shift significantly 
between voting districts from 2012 to 2015.  
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Table 2 
Summary Statistics 
Variable 
Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Min. Max. 
% No 56 61.38 5.26 51.17 73.77 
Registered voters 56 175654 196174.9 29495 1409813 
Average Age (by region) 56 42.45 1.25 39.8 44.2 
% First-time voters - 18 
years old (2012) 56 1.11 0.18 0.71 1.56 
Unemployment Rate (by 
region 2014) 56 25.57 2.55 20.1 28.7 
Support for Syriza 56 36.00 5.53 26.23 48.45 
Support for New 
Democracy 56 29.45 5.32 18.53 38.89 
 
Table 2 summarizes the characteristics of our variables over the period of our 
sample (2012--2015).   
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Table 3 
Matrix of Correlations 
 % No Registere
d Voters 
Average 
Age 
% 
First-
time 
Voter 
Unemplo
yment 
Rate 
Support for 
Syriza 
Support for 
New 
Democracy 
% No 1.00       
Registere
d Voters 
-0.04 1.00      
Average 
Age 
-0.33 -0.28 1.00     
% First-
time 
Voters 
0.30 0.10 -0.49 1.00    
Unemploy
ment Rate 
-0.18 0.26 -0.04 0.26 1.00   
Support 
for Syriza 
0.75 0.02 -0.12 0.24 -0.13 1.00  
Support 
for New 
Democrac
y 
-0.83 -0.21 0.34 -0.31 0.05 -0.84 1.00 
 
Table 3 provides a matrix of correlations between the variables. As the table 
shows, the correlation between variables ranges from a minimum correlation coefficient 
of 0.02 between the support for Syriza and registered voters within a region, and a 
maximum correlation coefficient of 0.75 between support for Syriza and the% that voted 
no.  
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RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
Table 4 shows the results for three separate regression specifications, estimated by 
OLS. These three models use the percentage of voters opposed to the bailout deal as the 
dependent variable. All three models are significant at the .01 level. 
 
Table 4 
Regression Results for the Effect of Political Party Support on Percent “No” 
% No Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Registered Voters 
-5.10e^-06 
(0.00)*** 
-5.59e^-06 
(0.00)*** 
-2.77e^-07 
(0.13) 
% First-time voters (18 years old) 
2.63 
(0.36) 
1.18 
(0.73) 
0.00 
(0.21) 
Unemployment rate 
-0.22 
(0.22) 
-0.18 
(0.30) 
 
Support for Syriza 
0.05 
(0.75) 
0.10 
(0.57) 
0.00 
(0.35) 
Support for New Democracy 
-0.79 
(0.00)*** 
-0.73 
(0.00)*** 
-0.01 
(0.00)*** 
Average Age 
 
-0.45 
(0.32) 
 
Regional Fixed Effects Included? No No Yes 
R-squared 0.75 0.76 0.81 
F-statistic 
Prob. > F 
24.73 
(0.00)*** 
21.46 
(0.00)*** 
11.10 
(0.00)*** 
 
Note: Each variable had 56 observations. Some variables were available only at the regional level 
(unemployment and average age), so the 56 observations were created by repeating the average 
regional observation for each voting district that falls within that region. All models were run 
with robust standard errors. We also tested for multicollinearity, and all models passed with a VIF 
score of 2.5 or less. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
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The first model included the number of registered voters, the percentage of first-
time voters, the unemployment rate, and the support for both New Democracy and Syriza 
in the recent legislative election. The coefficient on the number of registered voters was 
negative and significant, suggesting that an increase in the number of registered voters by 
one voter was associated with a very small reduction in the percentage of votes against 
the bailout. The two explanatory variables of interest both carried signs that make sense, 
given what we know about party platforms regarding austerity. The coefficient on 
support for Syriza was positive, but not significant. The coefficient on support for New 
Democracy was negative and significant, suggesting that a one percentage point increase 
in support for New Democracy in the previous election was associated with a 0.79 
percentage point reduction in the share of “no” votes. This makes sense, because given 
the fact that New Democracy was a pro-austerity party, we would expect regions with 
more support for this party to have a larger fraction of voters voting in favor of the 
bailout package. 
        The second model included all of the same variables as the first, but also included 
average age by region. As in the first model, the number of registered voters had a 
significant, but small effect in reducing the percentage of voters that voted “no.” The 
percentage of first-time voters, the unemployment rate, and average age were not 
significant, though. The coefficient on support for New Democracy again was negative 
and significant, with a slightly smaller effect than in Model 1. Support for Syriza was not 
significant, but did have a positive coefficient. 
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        The third model omitted the continuous regional variables (average age and 
unemployment) in favor of including a dummy variable for each region to test whether 
other unobservable factors at the regional level helped explain the variation in votes 
against austerity at the voting district level. (Athens was the omitted region.) The only 
region with a significant coefficient was the South Aegean region, with a coefficient of 
positive 0.04 and a p-value of 0.05. This makes sense given that Greek islands comprise 
the South Aegean region and that the conditions of austerity included doing away with 
tax breaks for this tourism-dependent area. In this model, New Democracy retained its 
sign and significance; Registered voters did not. 
        We also ran many other variations of these models with different combinations of 
explanatory and control variables. In all of the variations we ran, support for New 
Democracy had a negative and significant effect on the percentage of voters that voted 
“no” to austerity. The support for Syriza was not significant in any models we ran; 
however, the coefficient was consistently positive, as expected. These results provide 
evidence that party platforms had an effect on voter behavior in the 2015 referendum on 
austerity in Greece. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, we found evidence to support our hypothesis that parties have an 
effect on voter behavior in direct democracy measures. Support for one of the two major 
parties in Greece--New Democracy--lowered significantly the percentage of voters 
opposing the EU’s bailout package in the July 2015 referendum. Somewhat surprisingly, 
however, voters in districts returning stronger support for the anti-austerity Syriza party 
in January 2015 did not vote differently from voters elsewhere in Greece, according to 
our model. But New Democracy apparently was effective in reducing vote shares against 
austerity significantly, on average, suggesting that its message resonated with voters, but 
not enough to change the outcome overall. This finding provides one additional case 
study that contributes to the literature on the effect of party platforms on voter behavior 
in direct democracy measures.   
 Despite Syriza’s strong anti-austerity stance and Prime Minister Tspiras’s calls for 
a “no” vote, the party leader was soon forced to accept the conditions of a bailout 
package from the European Union and the International Monetary Fund. Upset at the 
conditions of the bailout, several members of parliament denounced their support for 
Syriza and decided to create their own party. As a result, Syriza lost its majority in 
Parliament in a “snap” election held in September of 2015. Despite failing to deflect the 
EU’s austerity measures, Syriza won just over 35% of the total vote. As a result, the party 
lost only four seats in the September election compared to the January 2015 election 
when the party first gained a majority, and was able to re-form its majority coalition 
government with the Independent Greeks (BBC, 2015, September 21).  
23 
This confirmation through the popular vote could be a signal that the Greek 
people knew Syriza’s anti-austerity talk was mostly symbolic. Perhaps they knew that the 
party’s hands were tied when it came to negotiating with European creditors. Maybe they 
are more forgiving than Greek MPs. Or maybe it was all just cheap talk all along.  
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